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Abstract: 
Linked to agricultural liberalization and deregulation, the recent food price crisis resulted into 
macro-actors' development and direct engagement into agriculture and land, particularly 
commercial banks, investment funds, asset management companies. These institutions 
developed renewed models of agricultural production and land acquisition: pre-crop model, input 
finance model, equity and investment fund models, partnership and share equity scheme models. 
Often less visible than direct ‘land grabbing’, these new models of agricultural productiona dn 
investment are vectors of profound agrarian restructurings, leading to questions regarding the 
concentration of land and of the agricultural sector in the hands of a few (international) (agri-) 
businesses, the status of (family) farmers and regarding the increasing inequalities that are 
arising. The paper describes and analyses the different agricultural production models being 
developed in the South African context and discusses their application and implications for the 
country’s as well as the continent’s agricultural development trajectories. These issues are 
essential considering that in the absence of alternative development models, this conception of 
agricultural development presently becomes the reference paradigm, in South Africa but also on 
the continent. It is indeed adopted by public development agencies (NEPAD, AfDB) and is 
exported by these “macro-actors” within the framework of their economic expansion on the 
African continent. 
 
1. Beyond land: the renewed interest in agricultural production 
The past few years have been characterized by a "rediscovery" of agriculture as a sector for 
strategic activity. As such, a multiplication of investment projects on the African continent have 
been observed mainly related to increased foreign direct investments (FDI) into agriculture. In 
2008, FDI into the African continent reached US$87,6 billion (i.e. 27 % higher than the previous 
year), of which a third (i.e. US$27 billion) has been directed towards the mining and agricultural 
industries in Sub-Saharan African countries (UNCTAD, 2009). Regarding the nature of these 
investments, is characterized by investors, public or private, national or foreign, acquiring land for 
agricultural and ecosystemic purposes, with investors endeavoring to develop their activities 
along the production chain, in particular focusing on primary production activities. This 
phenomenon is presently the object of extensive scientific analyses (Cotula et al., 2009; Görgen 
et al., 2009; FIAN, 2010; ). According to Cotula and Vermeulen (2009), a reversal of the risk/profit 
relationship appears within the production chain: Whereas primary production constituted until 
now the main risk factor, with profits returning to downstream and particularly upstream actors, 
the increase in agricultural prices now tends to invert this relationship. 
These investments are often referred to as “large-scale land acquisitions” or even “land grabbing” 
(Anseeuw et al., 2012; etc.). However, it seems that “land grabs” only represent the tip of the 
iceberg in terms of wider land-related and agrarian dynamics. These aspects, which interests us 
more particularly in this paper, are characterized by certain actors controlling, partially or totally, 
directly or indirectly, the process of agricultural production and land-based activities (without 
necessarily acquiring the land, although – as will be detailed – direct land acquisition might still 
occur). The motivations of the actors, the sectoral origins of the investors, the scale of the 
phenomenon and the focus and significance of the geographical areas concerned, result in this 
being a peculiar trend characterized by the development of new production and investment 
models (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2011). Although less visible than the direct large-scale land 
acquisitions, these new models are developing rapidly and are illustrative of far-reaching and 
profound agrarian transformations, with huge consequences for peasants and traditional land 
owners and users. 
In order to better understand these restructurings, this article details several new production and 
investment models developed in South Africa. While this country distinguishes itself by specific 
land and rural structures, related to the previous era’s legacy, it seems to pioneer the previously 
mentioned dynamics. As such, South Africa, as laboratory of new agricultural and investment 
practices, constitutes a valuable case-study for illustrating the current international dynamics. 
Section two of this paper presents the vector through which the current agricultural production 
and financial restructurings are taking place and will detail and analyse these new production and 
investment models, specific - at the moment - to South Africa. Before concluding, the paper 
provides in section three several reflections on the structural changes affecting South africa’s and 
Africa’s agricultural economies and societies. 
2. New models of agricultural financing and production - Production integration by macro-
actors and the finance value-chain 
This increasing control over land-based productive cycles, primary agricultural production in 
particular, is established through a strengthened vertical integration. Downstream (including 
financing) and upstream activities (distribution and commercialization) are undergoing an ever-
increasing concentration process to the advantage of some macro-actors. In addition to 
partnerships, but also – although in a looser way - contractualization etc., total integration of 
these activities allows dominant actors to widen their control over the productive cycle and the 
different value-chains in their entirety, in what is called the finance value-chain. The finance 
value-chain is the vector through which this capital inflow is channeled. "The finance value-chain 
structures investments which are proposed throughout the value-chain. The Financial services 
are often combined with marketing activities and possibly technical support" (Devèze, 2008) 
(Figure 1). Thanks to total control and to the circulation of capital and information flows, this 
approach also aims at limiting transaction costs and the risks inherent to the agricultural activity. 
  Figure 1: The finance value-chain and the advanced integration of value-chains. Source: 
Ducastel and Anseeuw (2011) 
Several models do appear and are being developed. They vary according to their institutional set-
up (internalization, contracts, production outsourcing, etc.) and to the actors involved (banks, 
intermediaries, investment funds, etc.). Without claiming to be exhaustive, three models are 
detailed in this article: bank integration, engineering companies’ engagement and investment 
funds. 
* Bank integration within agricultural value-chains 
Banks are traditional partners within the agricultural and agro-industrial sectors, which they 
finance through a “classic” form characterized by a loan granted and secured through collateral, 
generally land. In the context of greater prospects for financial returns, banks presently tend to 
strengthen their control and their participation along the agricultural value-chains, including in 
primary agricultural production. This banking integration is essentially established through the 
integration and contractualization of the various parties, in particular the producers (Figure 2). 
Concerning their relationships with the production, a new risk management strategy is occurring. 
Instead of using the land as collateral, it is the production which covers the granted loan. This 
evolution must be seen in the context of the increased cost of inputs relative to land values. In 
general, the latter is not sufficient as collateral to cover the farmers’ expenses. As such, the bank 
supplies the necessary liquidities in exchange for the rights over their future harvest. This contract 
is negotiated between both parties at the beginning of the productive cycle, in other words, even 
before seeds are sown. The farmer has in effect lost ownership over his/her production. 
The contract stipulates the type, the volume and the quality of the production, defined according 
to farm characteristics (size, soil quality, etc.) and previous production patterns of the farm, and 
the purchase price of the produce. This purchase price is calculated according to market 
projections. The producer has thus an income defined in advance, namely the amount of the 
production less the granted loan and the interest. In the event of a surplus or shortfall in the 
agreed upon volume and quality, the farmer is credited or debited to the corresponding amount. 
As such, the risk of production is transformed into performance risk, which is entirely born by the 
farmer. 
At the same time, the bank covers itself against production and production risks. On one hand, a 
multi-risk insurance, facilitated by the bank, ensures the production against all natural risks 
inherent to the agricultural activity (flood, fire, etc.) but also against side-selling, theft, etc. In 
addition, since the bank contracts several geographically dispersed farmers, it contributes to 
production risks limitations and it benefits from important economies of scale with insurance 
companies. On the other hand, the bank also limits the risks associated with price fluctuations. 
Indeed, it takes care of the commercialization management and price coverage through hedging 
on futures markets (i.e. mainly SAFEX’s futures market in the case of South African). The latter 
can be done before the bank effectively decides to engage in the primary production cycle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Direct bank integration into agricultural value-chains. Source Ducastel (2010) 
During the productive cycle, the bank and the insurance company monitor the production (mainly 
through agricultural engineers employed by the banks, but also through the use of satellite 
imagery). At the end of the harvest, the farmer delivers the production to a SAFEX certified silo, 
which guarantees the ownership of a certain volume at a specific quality to the bank. 
Commercialization, which is undertaken by the bank, is organized mainly through the financial 
market, SAFEX. 
Compared to contract farming models, this more integrated approach transfers all decision-
making processes to the bank. The latter not only provides finance and insurance, it also hedges, 
it also controls the commercial aspects through hedging as well as input provision and technical 
aspects via service delivery integration. In more extreme cases, certain banks have even 
acquired the land directly. 
It is estimated that around 30% to 40% of South Africa’s annual cereal production is controlled 
through the framework of these models. Indeed, the three main commercial banks engaged in 
such models (ABSA, Standard Chartered and RMB) each declare controlling approximately 13 % 
of the production (rarely more in order to limit risk). These banks presently diversify their 
agricultural activities towards horticulture, animal production and other agricultural sub-sectors. 
* Asset management and agricultural engineering companies’ model 
Sector integration can also take place through intermediaries, mainly agricultural engineering 
companies. The aim of these companies is to centralize all the farmer-oriented services (input 
supply, technical support, commercialization, etc.) within the very same entity. It thus proposes to 
the land owners a contractual arrangement representing an all-in-one integrated solution. 
In the majority of cases, there is no transfer or acquisition of land. The producer/land owner rents 
out his/her land to the management company. Production targets are agreed upon in a contract, 
as well as the production specifications and the producer’s corresponding remuneration. The land 
owner often has no insight into decision-making regarding the operations. In exchange, the 
company supplies directly inputs to the land owner and guarantees the sale price through the 
acquisition of positions on the futures market. Many of the adjoining activities, such as input 
provision, technical expertise, marketing, etc., are provided by the company itself, as part of its 
vertically integrated structure. During the production cycle, the company monitors closely the 
operations. Engineers are sent out, operations are overseen through satellite systems and the 
production accounts are kept under close observation. After the harvest, the company is in 
charge of the marketing of the production over which it retains sole ownership. Once the 
production is sold, the management company reimburses the loan granted by a financial 
institution (Figure 3). 
Within the framework of this model, the financial relationships are restructured or may even be 
non-existent for the producer/land owner. The relationship is between the bank and the 
associated company and is defined within the framework of a contract which stipulates that the 
intermediate company is both the guarantor of the seasonal loan and the party responsible for the 
production. The bank supplies thus the necessary liquidities and multi-peril insurances not to the 
farmer/land owner but to the intermediary. 
The added-value of such a model compared to the previous model seems to be the agricultural 
specialization of the management company and the proximity in the relationship between the 
latter and the main actors of the sector. The company makes its profit through its technologically 
advanced contribution to the agricultural operations, the economies of scale related to input 
purchases, insurances, etc. and through advanced risk management. As such, the relevant 
delegates the risks, price as well as production risks, to the intermediate company. This company 
in turn employs several risk management instruments. Firstly, it uses agricultural futures markets 
(SAFEX as well as Chicago) to guarantee the sales price and covers production risks through 
natural risks insurances. Secondly, besides the selection of producers according to their 
experience, previous results and farm characteristics, the company - through its direct presence 
in the field - tends to reduce the risks related to the volume and to the quality of the production. 
Finally, these companies tend to follow a double strategy of diversification. On the one hand, as 
in the previous model, they contract with geographically dispersed farmers/land owners; on the 
other hand, they develop their activities within several agricultural sub-sectors. If cereal 
production represents their primary target, they do not hesitate to commit to fresh produce 
production, biofuels or livestock. As with the bank integration model, asset management 
companies and agricultural engineering models can also directly acquire land. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The asset management and agricultural engineering model. Source: Ducastel (2010)  
It is at this stage difficult to estimate the extent of this model. The best established agricultural 
engineering company in South Africa is Farmsecure – a company without previous experience in 
the farming sector. Created in 2004 with the objective of engulfing small and medium-sized 
enterprises, it controls approximately 700 farming entities in South Africa, representing about 8 % 
of the nation’s annual cereal production. Other companies seem to structure and establish 
themselves rapidly. 
 
* The investments funds 
The South African farming sector has since 2008 been characterized by the proliferation of 
investment funds specifically dedicated to agriculture. The profile of these funds and the investors 
who contribute to them vary: commercial banks, institutional investors (pension funds), public 
actors (development agencies), etc. For the greater part, it concerns actors external to the sector. 
The management of these funds is generally entrusted to agricultural companies which have local 
experience and networks. 
According to the expectations of these investors (profitability, funds’ cycle) and of their forecasts, 
these funds adopt various strategies. Not all target the same assets, nor adopt the same 
management of these assets. As such, certain funds specialize in land acquisition as, for 
example, Emvest and African/South African Agricultural Fund (Table 1). In this case, these 
structures aim at acquiring, under purchase or long term lease agreement, farmlands with 
agricultural potential. Within this category of investment funds focusing on land, one can 
distinguish those that undertake directly the production on these farms from those that are 
outsourcing it. The first category focuses on an increase in productivity, through the use of high 
technology in particular, and on a rise in food commodity prices. The second group that focuses 
on leasing out land to farmers who are in charge of its development and production, speculate on 
the rise in land prices, and thus on the rent they’ll receive. Two types of speculation thus support 
this dynamic: the one directly related to land prices, the other one related to agricultural 
commodity prices. 
 
 Table 1 : Examples of investment funds specialized in agricultural initiatives in South Africa 
Investment fund 
(date of 
establishment) 
Fond owner Origin of capital  Capitalizati
on amount 
Investment capital Activity 
area 
Emvest 
(2008) 
Emergent Asset 
Management (UK-
based investment 
fund, specialized in 
emergent markets) & 
Russel Stone Group 
(SA agro-business) 
  -Land acquisition with direct engagement in production, transformation and 
commercialization 
-Several agricultural sub-sectors 
Southern 
Africa 
South African 
agricultural  fund 
& African 
Agricultural Fund 
(2010) 
Old mutual (SA 
financial institution) 
European and SA life 
insurance companies and 
pension funds  
R3 billion 
(Approx 300 
million 
Euros) 
Speculative land acquisition (no direct control over agricultural production) Southern 
Africa 
Zeder 
(2006) 
PSG (SA group 
dedicated to financial 
services) 
  -Minority position (between 20 et 34%) with agri-businesses 
-No direct implications regarding production but with managerial inference 
-Downstream and upstream activities 
South 
Africa 
Agri-Vie 
(2008) 
Sanlam (SA 
insurance company) 
Pension funds, Private 
foundations (Kellogs), Public 
institutions (Industrial 
Development Corporation) 
R700 
million (70 
million 
Euros) 
-Majority position in agri-businesses (cereals, livestock, horticulture…) 
-Direct control over production 
Priority given primary production 
Africa 
African 
Agricultural fund 
(2009) 
French development 
Agency (AFD) (?) 
AFD, AfDB, AGRA, IFAD, 
West African Dev Bank 
US$150 
million  
-Intégralité de la chaine de production agricole primary (production, 
transformation, infrastructures…) 
-Towards commercial agriculture (80% of capital) and family-based 
agriculture (20%) 
Africa 
TransFarm Africa 
(2011) 
NEPAD business 
foundation 
Private foundations (Hewlett) US$20 
million 
Strategy not developed yet Africa 
Fund of the Rand 
Merchant Bank 
(RMB – SA 
commercial bank) 
RMB Own funds   -Priority to transformation and commercialization agri-businesses - Shares 
of minimum 25% 
-Land acquisition (30 000ha in SA) 
-Management and direct implications for the company’s activities 
-Cereal and sugar cane 
Africa 
Source: Ducastel (2010) 
Table 1: Examples of investment funds specialized in agricultural initiatives in South Africa 
Certain actors looking to invest in the agricultural sector consider the direct land acquisition 
strategy, with or without control over the production, as too risky. In that case, equity funds 
constitute an alternative. The objective of the latter is to acquire equity shares into an agricultural 
or agro-industrial company. The risk is less high as capital is not placed in rigid and socially 
sensitive assets such as land. The agricultural company receiving these funds enjoys significant 
capital inflows which enable it to develop its activities. Although this financing model is less costly 
for the receiving agricultural company, compared to the loan-based system, it cedes in turn part 
of its autonomy to the investor. 
As is the case with the funds dedicated to land acquisitions, these investment funds lead to 
various strategies guided by the forecasts to which they adhere, and by the expectations of their 
investors in particular. For example, "fixed-term funds", i.e. those that have a life expectancy of 
between 10 to 15 years (although it may in some instances be  shorter), guarantee high returns in 
the short-term to their customers. They favour initiatives and activities offering fast and high 
returns for a minimal investment. On the other hand, the funds with no closing date adopt 
strategies based on the longer (sometimes longest) term with guaranteed and regular returns. 
It has been observed that on-going investment funds presently tend towards a preference for 
shares within already profitable and competitive companies. Such companies benefit from 
additional capital inflows to strengthen their position. As a result, the increased and massive 
interventions of investment funds are strengthening the positions of already dominant actors in 
the agricultural sector, to the detriment of others. According to the amount of shares acquired, 
which allow for a majority or minority position, the investment fund will have different rights 
regarding the management of the company’s activities. Again, different strategies occur here 
certain investment funds, in order to reduce risk and as it does not want to get involved in the 
production strategy and management, aim only at minority positions (between 20 and 34 % of the 
shares). On the contrary, other – more aggressive investors - tend to control all the activities of its 
subsidiaries by imposing its own management model (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2011). 
The extent of these investments is unknown, especially since several funds were only recently 
established and have yet to develop their implementation strategy (as in the case of the 
TransFarm Africa fund). 
3. Reflections on agriculture and the peasant 
This description of the state of macro-actor engagement in South African agriculture, based on 
the investment and production models currently being established, highlights several trends and 
brings to the fore a number of questions: 
* Financiarization and corporization of agriculture 
First of all, the models show that new actors are appearing on the South African agricultural 
scene. Indeed, originating from industrial or financial sectors, engaging as entrepreneurs, 
investors or even as pure speculators, the suppliers of capital seem more and more exogenous to 
the agricultural sector. Besides financing, these actors bring along renewed business logics, 
modes of actions and regulations, stemming from other sectors. As such, a restructuring of the 
sector is taking place which is redefining the borders of the agricultural sector. The increased role 
of banks and investment funds, for example, seems to lead to a "financiarization" of the sector. 
Indeed, the last couple of years, has seen an unprecedented boom in agricultural speculation. 
Whereas speculation has in the past been limited to an internal and short-term phenomenon, it 
has been evolving towards long-term strategies (IATP, 2008), led by actors external to the sector. 
As such, within the framework of the futures markets exchanges (SAFEX in South Africa), a 
decreasing number of contracts result in an effective delivery. This trend is similar to speculative 
mechanisms in other sectors, real estate in particular. 
The South African agricultural sector is currently also characterized by an industrialization 
process, or rather a "corporization" process. This dynamic does not characterize mechanization 
per se but rather a transformation of the production structures and their interactions. Increasingly, 
the agricultural value-chain tends to be controlled by one dominant actor. The control over 
various segments along this chain is established either through direct acquisition or through 
contractualization of the actors. While in South Africa the dominant actors include banks and 
certain former cooperatives, elsewhere other models engaging different macro-actors are 
emerging (e.g. Uruguay (FAO, 2009)). The organization of agricultural production tends towards a 
strongly integrated structure, comparable to Taylorist industrial chains, in which the most risky 
segments are outsourced towards intermediaries who support the costs and the risks. 
This dual process of – “financiarisation and corporisation” of the agricultural sector is leading to a 
new regime which is characterized by the dominion of a few large international food-business 
groups (Huggins, 2011) and could lead to the marginalization of the majority of African farmers 
due to biased power relations and confrontation with models of significantly higher productivity 
(Losch et al., 2010). 
* Concentration and dualisation within the sector 
These evolutions tend to strengthen the dualism within the South African agricultural sector. 
Whereas the macro-actors of the food-processing industry see their dominant positions 
strengthened, entire fractions of the (rural) South African society are excluded from these 
dynamics. Indeed, the selection process operated collectively by banks and insurance companies 
excludes the small farmers, as well as the emerging farmers (land reform beneficiaries). As the 
selection criteria include farm size (not less than 500ha under production at ABSA, for example), 
solvency and prior experience of/with the farmer, only well-established commercial producers are 
eligible. The entry barriers (capital, control over flows, compliance with  standards, etc.) are 
increasingly strenuous, limiting the possibility to participate for the majority of the producers and 
leading to amplified concentration. The evolution of the primary production segment seems to 
follow downstream (fertilizers, seeds, inputs) as well as upstream (processing, marketing, etc.) 
activities, which are already characterized by a limited number of actors controlling these markets 
at national (Greenberg, 2010) or international (McIntyre, 2009) level. 
Two groups of actors seem to benefit in particular from the agricultural restructuring. First of all, 
the financial actors (commercial banks, insurance companies, investment funds) which, by 
directly controlling an increasingly large portion of primary production and by imposing their 
selection criteria on producers, become the regulators of the sector. By integrating the entire 
value-chain and by centralizing the information flows, they anticipate the evolution of these 
markets, in particular the prices, act as arbitrators of these markets1 and seem to be capable of 
influencing the prices in their favour by speculating on the increase or decline according to the 
applicable forecasts. The second group to benefit from the evolution of the production structures 
are the agricultural intermediaries and asset management companies. Indeed, the financial 
                                                     
1 ABSA Bank is the « cleaning house » on SAFEX. 
institutions which intend investing in the agricultural sector increasingly depend on the services of 
agricultural engineering companies. As managers of both the field operations as well as the 
financial transactions, these companies are capturing an increasingly large portion of the margins 
generated by the agricultural activity. 
* Speculation and foreign powers 
The control of agricultural production by a small number of macro-actors, representing in many 
cases foreign capital, raises not only the problem of concentration and dualisation of the sector, it 
also draws attention to the need to analyse this phenomenon within the framework of the 
strategies of these actors. Indeed, the strong volatility of agricultural prices, strengthened by the 
removal of stabilization mechanisms in the context of market regulation facilitates economic 
agents’ direct involvement and control over agricultural regulation mechanisms. On one hand, 
speculation strengthens profit-oriented strategies, to the detriment of food safety concerns in the 
countries where the effective production takes place. On the other hand, as foreign economic 
powers control an increasingly large part of the production, it also emphasizes food sovereignty 
issues within these countries in a context of amplified liberalization. Producing countries’ food 
safety and sovereignty are thus at stake. 
Indeed, as noted by the special Rapporteur on the right to food2, a significant part of the volatility 
and the rise in prices can be explained by the emergence of speculation and an essential role is 
attributed to the participation of powerful institutional investors (investment funds, pension funds, 
commercial banks, etc.). These entities are often foreign owned with limited or no interest in the 
objectives of stabilization, food safety and food sovereignty. While the price volatility of 
agricultural commodities and the strategies of speculation raise problems related to the 
implementation of development programs, they also emphasize questions regarding the 
regulation of the agricultural and financial sectors and regulatory frameworks in a large number of 
domains including the functioning of the futures markets and foreign trade. It also leads to 
consideration related to national policies, the development of sector-based and financial 
strategies and regional integration. 
* Proletarisation and pauperization of the agricultural society 
While the emergence of these new production models generates numerous economic related 
uncertainties, it is the social impact which is most concerning. Indeed, one of the common 
characteristics of these innovations seems to be the increased marginalization of producers and 
farm workers. 
The incorporation process of family-based producers by macro-actors detrimentally impacts the 
former. Both parties have diverse financial, social and cultural resources leading to biased 
relationships (Borras, 2003), which seem to extend beyond the traditional cleavages within the 
South African agricultural sector. Land owners find themselves incorporated into production 
chains in which they are isolated actors with no decision-making or orientation power. Generally, 
the technical capital used, characterized by ever-increasing costs, does not belong to them but is 
made available by the management company. This situation creates a dependency for the 
farmers, since they become unable to withdraw from these production relations, without losing 
their access to the necessary financing and inputs. The granted funds are short-term, often linked 
                                                     
2  “Spéculation agricole et flambée des prix alimentaires. Réguler pour réduire les risques de volatilité”, note 
d’information du Rapporteur spécial sur le droit à l’alimentation, Septembre 2010. 
to the production cycle and correspond with the amounts calculated according to the production 
of specific quantities. As such, allocated funds do not allow additional productive investments and 
seems to condemn the producer to renew his/her seasonal commitment year after year. Although 
they are land owners, their situation is increasingly similar to that of proletarian agricultural 
employees or of service providers. 
These transformations not only impact the producer as economic agent, but in particular also as 
social actor. This "corporisation" perturbs social relationships and traditional features 
characterizing South Africa’s agricultural and rural environments. The family unit constituted until 
now the basic structure around which agricultural production was organized, both in the former-
homelands as well as on the white commercial farms. The incorporation of autonomous family 
enterprises into entrepreneurial structures necessarily modifies the relationships with the 
agricultural sector.  Beyond the producers and landowners, farm workers are also negatively 
affected.  The recourse to agricultural technologies that require low, often seasonal labour, tends 
to exacerbate the precariousness of the working conditions (Pons-vignon and Anseeuw, 2009). 
* South Africa: An agricultural laboratory for the continent? 
Several elements indicate that these investment and production models are expanding 
throughout the continent. On one hand, South African agricultural and agro-industrial companies 
are conquering new markets. As such, Farmsecure is already present in eighteen African 
countries and aspires to pursue its expansion, particularly in Western Africa. South African banks 
are also expanding their presence on the Continent. Standard Bank has in this respect operations 
in fourteen countries with a particular emphasis on agriculture while RMB is acquiring shares in 
various African banks to re-orientate their activities South African entities active in African 
countries (eg. AgriSA in the Congo) have furthermore, in recent months announced several large-
scale land acquisition projects. On the other hand, other international (RaboBank is already 
engaged in agriculture in about ten countries, prospection of Chinese banks through South 
African companies occur) and African companies/initiatives (a Kenyan investment fund is present 
in several East African countries) are developing their activities on similar models. 
If investment conditions are not as opportune and well-structured as in South Africa, measures 
are developed to adapt them to the local conditions. For example, investments in the local 
production of inputs are being realized to facilitate the development of a financing model without 
transfer of assets, in order to limit the risks in production environments less conducive than South 
Africa. A further example includes the development of prototypes of easily transportable silos that 
are adapted to various climatic conditions in the countries where such infrastructure is lacking. 
4. Conclusion 
The South African farming sector is presently characterized by important restructurings, related to 
the recent agricultural and financial crises and characterized by the “financiarisation” and 
"corporisation" of agriculture. The agricultural exception, as debated upon the inclusion of the 
sector in the WTO negotiations, has been buried once and for all. New actors, carriers of 
references and outside experiences, have entered the sector. Their interactions and inputs have 
been altering the sector’s "traditional" modes of action, investment and production. As such, a 
new agricultural development paradigm has been emerging (De Janvry, 2009) manifesting itself 
both at the national and international levels. 
These changes are leading to the concentration of agricultural activities in the hands of a few 
traditionally non-agricultural macro-actors. This category of investors is foreign to the traditional 
farming sector: it concerns, between others, financial actors, commercial banks and investment 
funds, aiming to diversify their portfolios. As a result of the widely held predictions, they perceive 
the agricultural sector as an investment for the future and engage as such in “Malthusian oriented 
speculation”. A directly related result is the "agricultural proletarianization" of smaller and 
emerging farmers, transforming the large bulk of family farmers into rent-seekers, service 
providers and/or agricultural workers on their own lands. 
In the absence of alternative successful investment and production models, this conception of 
agricultural development centered around macro-actors has become the reigning paradigm. 
While this is currently the case for South Africa, the model is spreading across the continent. 
Being exported by these macro-actors within the framework of their economic expansion, as such 
strengthening their models and their vision of agricultural development; it has been adopted by 
public development agencies (NEPAD, AfDB, etc.). These transformations lie at the foundation of 
the present agricultural development tensions: the debate between small-scale agriculture and 
the large mechanized operations, the opposition between speculative investment and food 
security and the questions related to the promotion of foreign investment and food sovereignty. 
They particularly underline the lack of reflections and debates around the implications of these 
transformations regarding national and international development policies and trajectories, 
whether agricultural or not, for these developing countries in search of alternatives. 
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